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# THE BIOPOLITICS OF DISABILITY AND ANIMALITY IN HARRIET MCBRYDE JOHNSON

*Jan Grue and Michael Lundblad*

### Introduction

This chapter represents a multidisciplinary and collaborative approach to an enduring problem in disability studies, namely the valuation of different lives and kinds of lives. The authors believe that this problem can be explored in interesting ways if disability studies and human-animal studies interact more closely. Historically, the academic fields that study disability and animality have not been in close communication. In fact, their relationship can perhaps more accurately be described as being *wary* of the implications of findings in the other field.

We feel, however, that communication – and collaboration – may turn out to be essential. This is partly because key problem areas that concern both fields, including the criteria according to which different lives are valued and what exactly constitutes a life that is worth protecting, are also approached through other lines of inquiry, including the neo-utilitarianism that is most closely associated with the philosopher and ethicist Peter Singer. In Singer's approach (admittedly simplified), capacities for higher cognitive functions and for suffering often become the major criteria that are deployed across species boundaries in order to determine the relative value of different beings, and thereby the lives of many animals *and* disabled people are potentially devalued.

The 2002 debate between Singer and Harriet McBryde Johnson, one of the major disability activists of her generation, is one of the points of departure for this chapter. In a much vaunted encounter at Princeton University, USA, Johnson defended the intrinsic value of the lives of human beings with disabilities, while effectively refusing to countenance Singer's position that species boundaries cannot by themselves constitute grounds for distinguishing between different forms of life.

In this chapter, we delve deeper into what lies beneath the Singer–Johnson encounter, along with Johnson's other writing, to consider the broader issues at stake. The chapter is structured as a dialogue. This reflects our desire not to conflate or artificially collapse animality studies and disability studies into a single disciplinary endeavour, but rather to find those areas and problems to which both fields have something important to contribute. We hope that the text will read not as a debate, but as an exploratory conversation with the shared purpose of finding out what disability studies and animality studies can teach each other, as well as other disciplines.

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### **Humans and other animals**

MIKE: Before her death in 2008, disability activist and lawyer Harriet McBryde Johnson published a novel, *Accidents of Nature* (2006), and a memoir, *Too Late to Die Young: Nearly True Tales from a Life* (2005). The memoir includes her account of meeting animal rights advocate and ethics professor Peter Singer, who invited her to give a talk at Princeton University in 2002. Singer's utilitarian philosophy notoriously questions the value of the lives of disabled people such as Johnson, who begins her description of the encounter rather dramatically: 'He insists he doesn't want to kill me. He simply thinks it would have been better, all things considered, to have given my parents the option of killing the baby I once was, and to let other parents kill similar babies as they come along' (2005: 201). While Johnson is of course appalled, along with disability advocates everywhere, she also tries to understand where Singer's arguments come from and how they might make sense to him. But she is unwilling to engage with Singer's thinking about animals and animal ethics when she is asked about it during the course of her visit to Princeton. Ultimately, she argues, 'I am still seeking acceptance of my *humanity*; Singer's call to get past *species* seems a luxury way beyond my reach' (ibid.: 228, emphasis added).

Jan and I come from different backgrounds, generally from disability studies and animality studies, respectively, but we have in common a deep frustration, to say the least, with Peter Singer's views. From my perspective, Singer is problematic as a representative of *animal* advocacy as well as in relation to human disability, even if I otherwise think that we should improve the ways we think about and act towards non-human animals. But Jan and I share a desire to think further about connections between disability and animality in new and hopefully more productive ways, particularly through the frameworks of biopolitics and posthumanism. We are also interested in exploring questions related to the possibility – or perhaps not – of certain kinds of coalitions between those working on animal and disability issues. Johnson's writing can help us to engage with the tensions and obstacles, as well as the potential, related to thinking across different forms of advocacy, even perhaps within the disability movement itself. In order to explore these issues, we will consider Johnson's memoir as well as her subsequent novel.

JAN: I'll pick up where Mike left off. I should probably add that my background is partly in disability studies in the American sense, but primarily from a Scandinavian tradition. This is a version of disability studies that has historically stressed incrementalism and normalisation, and which tends to construe the disabled individual in relation to a mostly benign state. The central metaphor in Scandinavian disability studies has been the 'gap' between *individual capabilities* and *societal demands*. It is a model of disability that presupposes a high degree of mutual interest between disabled people and the state, and which more than likely reflects the social democratic and egalitarian aspects of Scandinavian societies, but also its corporatist and conformist aspects. In Scandinavian disability theory, disability could in principle be eliminated, leaving only people who happen to have impairments but who have somehow been fully integrated and normalised.

By contrast, American disability studies, in which Johnson's work is situated, has much more strongly emphasised identity formation in opposition to state power and disability as a defining identity marker, or 'master status', to borrow the phrase of the sociologist Everett Hughes. This stance towards identity is one of the reasons I find US disability studies interesting in general and Johnson's work interesting in particular. The Scandinavian states, which are far more progressive in terms of economic policy towards disabled people than are the United States, also embrace, in a way largely unproblematised, what Rosemarie Garland-

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Thomson (1997) has termed the *normate*, namely the composite but chiefly *unmarked* identity position towards which disabled people are expected to strive *as individuals*. The position of the normate in Scandinavia is very strong, and this influences Scandinavian politics when it comes to gender, race, sexuality and very likely also animal rights. The Norwegian minister for integration announced on her Facebook page, on 18 October 2016, that ‘here [in Norway], we eat pork, drink alcohol, and show our faces’ – a statement which of course has multiple implications for vegetarians as well as for Muslims and Jewish people. Scandinavian societies, although they are descriptively and increasingly heterogeneous, remain to a large extent *normatively homogeneous*.

In his introduction, Mike touched on the possibility of building coalitions. Disability activism runs a risk of coalescing around what the World Health Organization, in its 2011 *World Report on Disability*, rather wonderfully terms ‘classic’ impairment groups – wheelchair users, blind people and deaf people, in case you were wondering. This is a very small subset of disabled people. The same report points out that one seventh of humanity is disabled. However, a far smaller number recognise themselves as such. The disability field is in dire need of coalition building in order not to be fragmented into a million diagnostic pieces. And as has been pointed out by disability scholars like Irving Zola (1972) and by sociologists of diagnosis like Annemarie Jutel (2009), diagnosis is in many cases a form of social control.

Coalition building requires finding a *voice*. And it has proved troublesome to find a way to voice disability as such. To me, that problem has to do with the matter of speaking on behalf of oneself or on behalf of others. One particular form of disabled experience is not necessarily *unique*, but it is usually, by definition, *outside the norm* in one way or another. In one definition, disability is the result of the full range of human biodiversity encountering sociopolitical structures. And speaking of ‘humanity’ raises not only problems relating to non-human animals (a topic that Mike will address more directly), but also the problem of silencing marginal voices.

One fundamental problem with Peter Singer’s work is and remains his assumption that ethics should be an attempt to assume a ‘universal point of view’, as in his book *Practical Ethics*. Drawing on the nineteenth-century utilitarian Henry Sidgwick, who coined the phrase ‘the point of view of the universe’, he attempts to generalise what is effectively the point of view of a particular kind of rational agent. It is universalism by way of particularism, and therefore obscures many if not most kinds of particular experience, of particular lives.

Harriet McBryde Johnson’s position, by contrast, is specific, if not particularist, and fiercely so. Moreover, her position appears to me reflective of a specific and particular historical moment – essentially, the first historical moment in which physically disabled people were in a position where they could speak for themselves, as opposed to being spoken for. That stance is still a fairly new one in Scandinavia, where disability politics are still strongly influenced by voices speaking *on behalf of* disabled people, whether family and next of kin, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) run by non-disabled people who are often next of kin, or social researchers. We are trying to figure out what disability identity might be in this unipolar society, which is, I think, very susceptible to the kind of universalist utilitarianism advocated by Singer.

If I can generalise for a moment, Scandinavian disability politics, which is a form of biopolitics, appears vulnerable to a kind of false universalism, a stance in which every disabled person can and should become a ‘normal’ citizen, but only at the cost of disavowing their particular embodiment and its enduring difference. It obviates the possibility of coalition building, since no coalitions should exist outside the bounds of normal citizenship.

Johnson, along the same generalising lines, indicates a kind of American disability politics that stresses particular forms of experience. It is linked to the identity politics argument that *speaking for oneself* is politically necessary, and it actualises the problem of coalition building in

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a different way. If experience is highly divergent, if it is difficult if not impossible to speak on behalf of others – how is a broad coalition inside the disability field possible, let alone beyond it?

#### **Coalition building and advocacy**

MIKE: I think Jan's question about speaking for oneself as opposed to speaking for others is quite useful when comparing and situating different forms of advocacy related to both disability and animality. It is only relatively recently that animal studies has become more prominent in the academy, even though organised advocacy on behalf of animals can be traced historically in the United States and Europe back to the nineteenth century. The publication of Singer's book, *Animal Liberation*, in 1975 can be seen as a watershed moment in the contemporary movement for animal rights, but influential critiques of his work have grounded other forms of animal studies – or what I would prefer to call attention to *animalities* of various kinds – in the academy for several decades by now, ranging from Donna Haraway to Jacques Derrida, Cary Wolfe, and many others.<sup>1</sup> The question of 'voice' in relation to non-human animals – or 'speaking for animals' who cannot 'speak for themselves' – also has a long history, but similarly has been critiqued for its insistence on voice in a traditional sense, along with supposedly clear boundaries between 'the human' and 'the animal'. We have difficulties imagining dogs writing their own memoirs, for example, or chickens organising their own protests against factory farms. To compare the disability movement's mantra of 'nothing about us without us' to the potential for non-human animals to 'speak for themselves' might thus seem absurd at best and highly offensive at worst. But there is also potential for further reflection here, including the consideration of 'voices' that might be difficult to hear or recognise. Among the diverse range of life forms that we tend to lump together as either human or animal, there are all kinds of beings whose 'voices' cannot register as 'normal' or even 'human'. Cognitive disabilities, brain injuries and terminal illnesses can complicate the idea that all humans have the same kind of voice. And what about apparently 'normal' voices that raise difficult questions about agency and authenticity, perhaps crystallised most famously in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's question, 'Can the subaltern speak?' And yet we might be able to acknowledge the ways that individual humans are constructed by discourse while also listening to different forms of communication and considering more complicated ways of trying to understand what various individuals situated in particular historical and cultural contexts might need or want. It might not be such a leap, then, to consider how to respond to *non-human* voices that might be more difficult to recognise, beyond examples such as non-human primates communicating through human sign language. What might various individual *animals* in diverse circumstances and contexts need or want? Could this kind of a question lead to more productive possibilities when considering advocacy across species lines?

Johnson's own resistance is clearly based upon her reaction to Singer's logic in particular, which is certainly offensive enough. While Singer subsequently gives her a copy of his book *Writings on an Ethical Life*, 'so that you will have better answers to questions about animals' (2001: 222), Johnson never changes her position. But I would argue that there is further potential in her work for breaking down the human/animal binary, perhaps suggesting different ways in which disability and animality could be theorised more productively in conversation with each other, even if Johnson herself does not want to go there. In an imagined conversation with her sister, for example, in which she imagines the best way to summarise her thoughts after the encounter with Singer, she points out that 'he thinks the humans he is talking about aren't people, aren't persons' (2005: 225). While that kind of

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logic can be turned toward deeply problematic attitudes, decisions and policies, it can also suggest that the category of ‘the human’ is a constructed one, and that there might be some potential for coalitions in relation to those beings deemed somehow less than human, whether human or not. Rather than going along with Singer, then, we can turn our attention back to the discourses and powers that determine who is granted the category of ‘the human’ – and who is denied it, or who can be seen as *losing* one’s humanity through disabling illnesses and conditions. Furthermore, and here is where we might depart more radically from Singer, we might begin to see the basis for a different sort of coalition, a shifting, contingent and strategic kind of alliance, in which advocacy might be mobilised against traditional ways of constructing ‘the human’ and ‘the animal’. Biopolitical formulations of these categories maintain the capacity to render certain lives – whether human or non-human – less valuable and therefore disposable. As Cary Wolfe has argued, in other words,

as long as this humanist and speciesist *structure* of subjectivization remains intact, and as long as it is institutionally taken for granted that it is all right to systematically exploit and kill nonhuman animals simply because of their species, then the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social other of whatever species – or gender, or race, or class, or sexual difference.

(2003: 8, *emphasis in the original*)

To this list, of course, we need to add disability.<sup>2</sup> To reject this discourse does not mean that other hierarchies might not take its place. But we might move instead towards less universalist and more specifically situated consideration of needs and wants in diverse contexts.

Towards the end of Johnson’s memoir we are given her vision for disability advocacy: ‘For decades, little noticed by the larger world, the disability rights movement has been mobilizing people from the back rooms and the back wards, along with more privileged people like me, to speak plainly about our needs’ (2005: 253). Yet this kind of advocacy would not seem to be available to those with cognitive disabilities, for example, or non-human animals, unless we maintain the simple binary opposition between ‘speaking for oneself’ and ‘speaking for others’ and say that ‘we’ should speak for those who cannot speak for themselves. Johnson’s vision also insists on another key element, though: ‘We need to confront the life-killing stereotype that says we’re all about suffering. We need to bear witness to our *pleasures*’ (ibid., *emphasis added*). At the same time, Johnson’s subsequent examples generally privilege the things that those with physical rather than cognitive disabilities can do. While I certainly agree that disability needs to be disassociated from only negative constructions, I am left wondering about this other potential problem for coalition building. If we want to think about better ways of putting animality and disability together, what might we want to do – or not – when it comes to putting different forms of *disability* together?

JAN: Mike’s last question is certainly relevant to the disability movement and its historical problem of sustaining grand coalitions over time. The most effective American examples of coalition building that I can think of have been centred on particular historical moments and initiatives, on legislation and protest, while, perhaps tellingly, the broadest Scandinavian coalitions centre on welfare policies that affect the largest number of disabled people. In such cases it is a matter of broadening the ranks, while perhaps not thinking too deeply about what defines the coalition.

The matter of negatives and positives is also important. Whenever the disability community tries to define itself in terms of positive attributes, it runs into trouble, because the more

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universally ‘disability’ is defined, the more inherently it is marked by negative attributes. There are many pleasurable things about particular disabled lives, but the disabled life *in general* is another matter.

This problem, which in disability studies is sometimes termed the problem of *affirmation*, is borne out in Johnson’s young adult novel *Accidents of Nature*. Here, Jean, the narrator, is a teenage girl whose cerebral palsy brings her to Camp Courage, a sardonically named North Carolina summer arrangement for children with various disabilities. The camp is very much a ‘big tent’ into which kids with physical and mental impairments have been – to borrow an animal metaphor – herded. This kind of ‘big tent’ is probably familiar to anyone who has worked on the organisational structures of the disability field, as I once did for my PhD. On the one hand, there is ample room for positive identity formation and deployment of strategic essentialism. A case in point would be the major Norwegian disability NGOs, which have used these to good effect in negotiating with the state on issues of crucial economic importance.

On the other hand, there are great and significant differences between the people in the tent, and these differences come to the fore at crucial moments. In *Accidents of Nature*, the character of Sara attempts resistance by staging a ‘Telethon to Stamp Out Normalcy’. She wants to expose the hypocrisies of the adult ableist world. She wants to upend and invert its hierarchies. But in order to do so, she effectively has to form a cadre party among the disabled kids, which we are given to understand consists of the most intellectually capable among them. The kids who are left out of her plans – who are given non-speaking parts, effectively – are the kids with developmental disabilities, the kids who cannot speak for themselves in the first place. Thus, the dominant cultural hierarchies are in fact reproduced within the activist sphere. Historically, activism based on solid identity formation has depended on finding a strong voice. Sara’s great strength is her verbal dexterity, her wit, her capacity for satire. And these *are* strengths – in an ableist world, according to ableist standards. This emphasis on strength – ultimately, perhaps, on particular kinds of *ability* – has underpinned many conflicts, including coalition-destroying ones in the disability field.

‘Disability’ is a historically situated and socially produced category; critiquing that category and its oppressive functions is one of the things that the disability field tries to do. But this does not solve the problem of how to build a coalition that is *for* something. Any definition of the category of disability – and such definitions are inevitably problematic – must at some stage involve weakness, limitations, or lack. And acknowledgement of weakness must be central to any kind of strategic essentialism relevant to the disability field. But these are difficult concepts to embrace. And the fact that they remain makes it difficult to assert what comes after, or instead of, disability.

In the novel, Sara’s ‘Telethon to Stamp Out Normalcy’ borrows the tropes of ableism and attempts to invert them. Doing this, however, results in an aporia. Disabled kids play able-bodied kids wishing that they were disabled, but the text offers no explanation of *why* this would be the case, beyond a desire to be ‘like everyone else’. But if disability constitutes normalcy, even the normate, nothing has truly changed – either in terms of valuation or in political terms.

To me, this goes to the heart of the matter. There is a case to be made both for satire and for critique, but neither format is necessarily conducive to alliances, coalitions and progressive advancement. Consider this: most attempts to develop strategic essentialism in the disability field have foundered on the distinction between impairment and disability. There are numerous examples of effective strategic essentialism anchored in *impairment communities*, possibly because these communities can be organised around values that code as positive in dominant valuation systems. In the United Kingdom, in a particular historical phase, such a

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community was the origin of the British social model. That community was also organised around the strategic essentialism of the identity of white male wheelchair users, particularly those with spinal cord injury. It was organised around a particular conception of strength, which owed much to Marxist ideals of productive masculinity. It was politically effective and also highly exclusionary.

Strategic essentialism for the *disability community* is, for these reasons, much more slippery and problematic. I'll return to the 'Telethon to Stamp Out Normalcy'. It is notably void of content. It fleetingly suggests that it is 'the year 2030' after 'Cripples took control' (2006: 176). This is Sara's utopian vision, where normalcy is stigmatised and crippledness is admired. It represents the asymmetric social relationships between Norms and Cripples, focusing attention on the micro-interactional power strategies that sustain both the smaller and the larger camps: patronising, humiliating, shaming, silencing. But it has nothing to say about what brought the Cripples together.

In the proximate term, what brings the Cripples of the camp together is the fact that their lives are governed in a particular way. For many kids, their lives at camp are not that different from their lives at home, which may be an institution rather than a family home. Each aspect of their behaviour is closely monitored and regulated. Their bodies, however different, are subjected to universalist regimes of control and productive power.

Solidarity and strategic essentialism, therefore, must perhaps find their loci in the biopolitical structures that produce the 'big tent' of disability. What I am not sure about is whether this manoeuvre will result in the tent coming down, let alone what will happen if and when it does.

We know that disability is a historically contingent category. The word has a long history in English. Its usage is tied to wars and to the actions of the state. It replaced a variety of older, perhaps narrower and definitely nastier words. It should, I think, be recognised as the hallmark of a particular kind of biopolitics, a particular kind of herding of a section of humanity. I am convinced that the concept remains necessary, but I am increasingly sceptical about whether it can serve as a vector for any kind of useful strategic essentialism.

### **Essentialism and valuation hierarchies**

MIKE: I might be more willing to embrace strategic essentialism in particular situated contexts for those who are disabled and for those who are animalised, whether human or not. But I want to return to Johnson's novel to illustrate how animality and disability can become linked in problematic ways, particularly when animality is naturalised as that which needs to be tamed, even if it is the narrator's own body.

The campers are often compared to a herd in a general sense, as they are moved around the camp and into various activities. On their way indoors to eat, for example, we are told that 'It is like a cattle roundup. We join the slow-moving herd inside, and I am corralled' (2006: 31). But these comparisons come from Jean, not from the counsellors or administrators of the camp.

At the same time, she suggests that 'submission' is the 'natural' thing for animals to do, be that a real animal or her own animalised body. When she goes horse riding, for example, she tells us, 'I'm not depending on anyone. Well, except the horse, but to the horse I am *master*' (ibid.: 80, emphasis added). When it comes to her own body, Jean adopts the same hope for mastery, since she constructs her body as the 'animal' part of her that needs to be controlled. She must be 'wrestled' into a canoe, for example, even though she wants to go: 'My mind tells my body to submit, don't fight. But my body won't give in' (ibid.: 124). Caught like a fish, perhaps, she tries to 'enjoy the ride', but she can only 'dread the lift out of the canoe. I don't want that cute guy to wrestle me *like a wild animal*' (ibid.: 126, emphasis added). Most

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disturbing, though, from my perspective, is when she later fantasises about having sex with a ‘normal’ guy who seems to be forcing her animalised body to submit: ‘He dodges my punches and kicks; finally he pins my legs with his legs and shoves my arms out of his way... [and] does what needs to be done. Relief. It’s over’ (ibid.: 155–156).

Jean eventually recognises her self-loathing of her own disabled body and by the end appears to be moving towards a recognition that just trying to be ‘normal’ will no longer be tenable as she looks ahead to college and beyond. The ending is perhaps debatable in terms of where the text wants our sympathies to lie: possibly with the narrator Jean and her growing recognition that her family will no longer be able to understand her fully, that the experience of disability sets her apart in ways that might lead to solidarity with, if not advocacy for, other people with disabilities. Or should we sympathise with the fictional letter that closes the novel, in which Sara looks back 30 years later, only vaguely remembering Jean, but indicating that a Marxist-inspired resistance must be continued? Or both?

The point I want to emphasise, though, is that the text never questions discourses of animality that naturalise ‘the animal’ (including Jean’s own body) as that which needs to be mastered or tamed. This kind of logic has long been used to justify mastery over other *human* populations that have been animalised historically, whether in the ‘peculiar institution’ of slavery in the United States and beyond, or through various histories of colonisation and neo-imperialism around the world. These histories might seem disconnected from questions about eating meat, for example, and in the novel Jean has no problems with eating meat – reminiscent, perhaps, of Johnson’s own responses to Peter Singer. But paying attention to the ways that discourses of animality can *enable* discourses of disability, in which disabled lives are somehow less than ‘human’, seems to me to be a more productive frame for advocacy. It is not that I think that the kids at the camps should have all suddenly become vegans, but that we can recognise the ways that animalising *animals* – as beings whose lives exist to be mastered, or tamed, or eaten – can also naturalise the *category* of the animal, which can subsequently be deployed to construct disabled human lives as somehow lower, discardable, or disposable. Everyday suffering is too complicated to assume that all animal advocates must be vegans, or, to take another difficult example, that all disability advocates must always be pro-life. But when (not if) our own lives contribute to the suffering of other lives, or we want to advocate for our own lives or for the lives of others, we might want to have better grounds for justifying our actions and beliefs than simplistic binaries between ‘the human’ and ‘the animal’.

JAN: Mike’s point here invokes a fundamental problem of intersectionality, which is how certain forms of embodied difference have historically been used to marginalise other groups. I am thinking here of how discourses of impairment and disability were often invoked to justify the enslavement of black people, and in order to justify the repression of women. The classic tropes here are those of smaller brains and weaker bodies, generating discourses in which various minorities were framed as impaired relative to the (white male) majority population, and therefore in need of being subjected to a particular kind of control. Resistance to this kind of control, particularly when based on strategic essentialism, sometimes came at the cost of accepting the *premises* of these discourses – that weakness or impairment were legitimate grounds for oppression.

This poses a problem for coalition building. I strongly suspect that an effective coalition has to be a coalition *against* something, and I do not think that ‘something’ should be Peter Singer, or any particular individual.

‘Ableist society’ may be a better candidate, but any such definition should also account for the underlying valuation systems, that is to say for the currently ubiquitous neo-utilitarian ideology that is supported and abetted by Big Data. This valuation system, which is robust

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and imperialistic, claims universal applicability while at the same time being intolerant of variable embodiment, subjective experience, and, ultimately, relational phenomena. It is atomistic and presupposes a universal standard of comparison, particularly for the good or well-lived life. It is against this kind of standard that every disabled life and many animal lives are measured and found wanting. The view from nowhere, the point of view of the universe, is of course a view from somewhere, a putative centre. Although clearly a modern phenomenon, adapted to and suitable for modern bureaucratic societies, this valuation system adheres peculiarly closely to older systems like the Great Chain of Being.

My first and hitherto strongest impression of the significance of Harriet McBryde Johnson's work arose from her description of her spine. In describing, in her memoir, her resistance to being surgically corrected, to finding comfort in her own skin, she articulates a biopolitics of great individual specificity, in which the acknowledgement of unique subjectivity is the essential component.

This acknowledgement opens the door to a range of coalitions, though they will not necessarily be the most *effective* coalitions one could imagine. The problem was pointed out quite precisely by Harriet McBryde Johnson herself: in seeking acceptance for one's humanity, there is little to be gained in looking beyond one's species. But if the goal is, rather, to seek acceptance of one's vulnerability, it may be inevitable. This forces us to consider not only what coalitions can be built, and how, but of which valuation systems – the valuation of various kinds of lives – they critique and which ones they aim at developing. As with animality studies, these issues have long been inherent in disability studies; there is every reason to bring them to the fore.

### Notes

- 1 For more on differences between animal studies, animality studies, human-animal studies and post-humanist theory, see Lundblad (2017). This collection also illustrates various kinds of recent work in these fields from contributors such as Cary Wolfe, Anat Pick, Colleen Boggs and Neel Ahuja. For earlier examples, see DeKoven and Lundblad (2012), with contributions from Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Martha Nussbaum, Frans de Waal, Temple Grandin, Carol J. Adams and Paola Cavalieri.
- 2 Wolfe does consider disability in relation to posthumanism in the case of Temple Grandin in his *What Is Posthumanism?* (2010: 127–142).

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